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I
INTRODUCTION

In the last ten years, securities regulators have made substantial progress
in developing cooperative relationships to reduce the value of international
borders as barriers to the detection and prosecution of securities fraud.
Having made that progress, attention now should turn to ensuring that those
committing fraud will not only be caught and prosecuted, but also will be
deprived of the financial fruits of their illegal activities.
Transactions on U.S. securities markets can originate virtually any place in
the world. In order to carry out trades, one needs only a phone line and
access to a wire transfer facility. Regulators, however, cannot cross borders
with the same ease as the transactions they may need to investigate. While
regulators have resolved many of the territorial and sovereignty issues that
previously constrained their ability to investigate and pursue suspect foreign
transactions, similar constraints hamper the freezing of assets and recovery of
ill-gotten gains located in other jurisdictions. This article focusses on the
development of mechanisms, similar to those used for information-sharing,
pursuant to which regulators can assist each other in freezing assets and
recovering illicit profits.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and many of its
foreign counterparts have addressed territorial and sovereignty concerns by
creating cooperative mechanisms for gathering and exchanging information
for use in international investigations. These mechanisms, commonly
referred to as Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs"), effectively extend a
regulator's investigative reach beyond its national boundaries. Thus, through
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MOUs, regulators are better able to investigate and prosecute successfully
persons engaging in illegal transactions conducted in or affecting domestic
securities markets that emanate from abroad.' The ability to prosecute
foreign-based fraud is only part of the challenge, however. In the end,
success will be judged by whether those committing fraud can hide ill-gotten
gains, thereby reaping the financial benefits of wrongdoing, or whether the
funds will be recovered for the benefit of investors. The ability to recover
assets also will enhance the value of the ties forged by regulators to fight
cross-border fraud.
Effective enforcement of securities laws requires that regulators be able to
thwart the dissipation or secreting of the fruits of international securities
fraud, and to facilitate the return of the illicit profits to injured investors. 2 In
addition, as with cooperative mechanisms for information-gathering, the
development of any mechanisms designed to facilitate the recovery of illgotten gains will enhance confidence in global securities markets and facilitate
3
possible harmonization and mutual recognition of regulatory schemes.
This article describes the current legal framework for executing judgments
obtained by securities regulators and explores issues that have arisen in this
context. Based on recent experiences in developing cooperative
arrangements to resolve problems concerning international informationgathering, it concludes by proposing alternatives for resolving problems in
4
executing securities judgments.

1. Both an indication of, and source for, the success of the MOU approach is the growing
unanimity among securities regulators in support of it. See, for example, Resolution Concerning Mutual
Assistance with the International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), 43 SEC Docket 168
(Nov 7, 1986); Report Addressing the Difficulties Encountered with Negotiating and Implementing Memoranda of
Understanding, approved at XVth Annual Conference of IOSCO, Santiago, Chile, 1990 ("Santiago
Report"); Principlesfor Memoranda of Understanding, approved at XVIth Annual Conference of IOSCO,
Washington, DC, 1991.
2. See International Capital Markets Group, Part III Paper on International Regulatory Issues
(March 1991), prepared by the Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs, with the assistance
of the International Bar Association and the International Federation of Accountants:
Also of importance [in addition to agreement to share information] is authority for the
global recognition of court judgments in order to, for example, reach foreign deposits of
unlawful profits, or to recognize preliminary injunctions to freeze assets not within the
jurisdiction of the court. The latter is important even though the court may have
jurisdiction over the person with control over the account in question.
3. In the SEC's first multijurisdictional disclosure system, entered into with Canada, the SEC
relied upon the MOU with Canadian regulators as one factor supporting the recognition of a foreign
disclosure system. MOU between the SEC and the Ontario Securities Commission, the Commission des Valeurs
Mobilieres du Quebec and the British Columbia Securities Commission, 43 SEC Docket 186 (Jan 7, 1988). See
also Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifcations to the Current Registration and Reporting System for
CanadianIssuers, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") Rel No 34-29354, 56 Fed Reg
30036 (July 1, 1991); Recognition of Foreign Broker-Dealer Regulation Release, Exchange Act Rel
No 27018, 54 Fed Reg 30087 (July 11, 1989); Stabilizing to Facilitate a Distribution, Exchange Act
Rel No 34-28732, 56 Fed Reg 814 (Jan 9, 1991); and Anant K. Sundaram, National Sovereignty to Blame
for BCCI Scandal, Wall St J A 17 col 3 (Oct 24, 1991). In his editorial, Sundaram urges the immediate
convention of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") conference to resolve issues of
regulatory disharmony among banking regulations as a way of avoiding future scandals. He notes
that regulatory inconsistencies may exist due, among other reasons, to the lack of comprehensive
mechanisms for cross-border enforcement of laws.
4. There is a distinction between recognizing a judgment and enforcing a judgment:
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II
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ANCILLARY PROVISIONAL
REMEDIES IN CASES INITIATED BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION

It is well established that the SEC can seek, and U.S. courts can order, the
disgorgement of proceeds illegally obtained as a result of federal securities
law violations. 5 The primary purposes of such orders are to deprive
wrongdoers of unjust enrichment and to deter others from violating securities
laws by taking the profit out of crime. 6 In fiscal year 1990, the SEC obtained
court orders requiring defendants to disgorge the record amount of $589
million, including $400 million paid by Michael R. Milken. 7 In addition to
seeking disgorgement in civil actions, the SEC now has the power to order
disgorgement in administrative proceedings. 8 However, the right to request
the disgorgement of illegal profits is meaningful only to the extent that such
proceeds are identifiable and can be preserved. Accordingly, an important
step toward the recovery of funds is the ability to seek asset-freezes. 9 Absent
such asset-freezes, the effectiveness of a final judgment commanding
disgorgement may be undermined by a defendant dissipating or secreting the
funds.
Currently, no comprehensive mechanism exists by which the SEC is able
to enforce effectively final judgments and ancillary provisional relief outside
the United States.' 0 This gap has reduced the SEC's efforts to recover illicit
profits to a race to the border to prevent the illegal gains from leaving the
jurisdiction of a U.S. court. I I
A foreign judgment is recognized when a court concludes that a certain matter has been
decided in the judgment and therefore will not be litigated further. A foreign judgment is
enforced when a party is accorded part or all of the relief to which the judgment entitles
him.
Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in the United States, 17 VaJ Intl L 401 (1977).
5. See, for example, SEC v First City FinancialCorp., 890 F2d 1215 (DC Cir 1989); SEC v General
Refractories Co., 400 F Supp 1248 (D DC 1975).
6. General Refractories Co., 400 F Supp 1248.
7. In 1991, the SEC obtained court orders for disgorgement of approximately $119 million.
See 1990 SEC Annual Report 1, 8.
8. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-429,
104 Stat 931 (1990), codified at 15 USC § 78(a) (1989). See also Colleen P. Mahoney, A Summary of
the Remedies Provisionsof the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Practising
Law Inst, 1991).
9. See SEC v Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F2d 1082, 1106 (2d Cir 1972); SEC v Vaskevitch,
657 F Supp 312, 315 (SD NY 1987); SEC v FondationHai, 736 F Supp 465, 474 (SD NY 1990); SEC v
Unifund SAL, 910 F2d 1028, 1041-43 (2d Cir 1990).
10. Indeed, even for private litigants there are obstacles and difficulties to obtaining recognition
of U.S. provisional judgments. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 481 (1987) ("Judgments granting injunctions ... are not generally entitled to enforcement
.... "). See also von Mehren, 17 VaJ Intl L at 406 n25 (cited in note 4) (citing the New York State
Bar Association Report and Proposed Resolution of Committee on International Law: "nonrecognition of United States' judgments abroad is the rule rather than the exception .
); Charles
Platto, ed, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments Worldwide (Graham & Trotman, 1989).
11. While U.S. courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction when significant conduct occurs
in the United States or when it occurs outside the United States but has a significant effect within the
United States or on the interests of U.S. investors, see, for example, Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
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SEC v. Wang and Lee

In SEC v. Wang and Lee, 12 the SEC alleged that Stephen Wang, an
employee of a New York investment banking firm, stole "inside" information
and provided it to Fred C. Lee, a Taiwanese national, for trading purposes,
and that Lee traded on the information through a series of nominee accounts
in the United States and overseas. The SEC filed a civil action, as described
more fully below. Among other things, the SEC requested that the U.S.
district court order a U.S. branch of a Hong Kong bank with which Lee
maintained accounts to pay monies controlled by Lee into the U.S. court
registry. The SEC's actions to ensure the preservation of Lee's assets raised
concerns in the international banking community about the validity of the
separate entity doctrine, under which each branch of a bank is treated as a
juridical entity separate from the parent.13
Prior to the initiation of the civil suit, Lee agreed to testify in Hong Kong

in connection with the SEC's investigation. While under oath, Lee initially
denied trading on material nonpublic information. Lee then abruptly sought
to withdraw this testimony and, through counsel, admitted that he had
illegally purchased securities on the U.S. markets. This recantation took place
on June 24, 1988, the same day Lee instructed certain banks and brokerage
firms in the United States to transfer funds representing his liquid assets to
Hong Kong.' 4 In response to Lee's efforts to move assets outside the United
States, on June 27, 1988 the SEC filed an action against Wang and Lee and
made an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") that
included an asset-freeze provision. The SEC argued that expedited action
was necessary in light of Lee's ongoing attempts to remove his illicit profits
from the United States. Later that day, the court granted the TRO, which
included a freeze of all Lee's assets. The TRO was then served on all known
holders of Lee's assets, including Standard Chartered Bank ("SCB"), a British
bank with branch offices in Hong Kong and New York.
F2d 974, 987-92 (2d Cir 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326, 1333
(2d Cir 1972); Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 206-07 (2d Cir), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F2d
215 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc); Alfadda v Fenn, 935 F2d 475, 478 (2d Cir 1991), enforcement power is
effectively limited to those persons over whom the courts have personal jurisdiction. See Bersch, 519
F2d at 999-1000; Leasco, 468 F2d at 1341-42; Fondation Hai, 736 F Supp at 469. Thus, where the
fruits of fraud are removed from the United States and the wrongdoer who controls those fruits is in
a foreign country, the U.S. court may be left without means of enforcing relief.
12. Litigation Rel No 11780 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 93,802 (SD
NY 1988).
13. The separate entity doctrine dates from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was
designed to protect banks from having multiple withdrawals made for the same funds from different
branches of the same bank. See, for example, Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks For Deposits
Placed in their Foreign Branches, 1I L & Pol Intl Bus 903, 907, 930-44 (1979). Today, in light of highspeed electronic communications between even the most far-flung offices, that rationale for the
doctrine has been substantially weakened.
14. On that same day, Lee's counsel also admitted to the SEC that Lee was already attempting to
transfer funds out of the United States to Hong Kong, that Lee would continue those efforts, and
that he would continue to trade in the U.S. securities markets. See Declaration of Gary S. Kaminsky
[counsel for the SEC] in Support of Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Other Related Matters.
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Almost immediately after the issuance of the TRO, Lee violated the order
by demanding that SCB release to him funds that represented the profits of
his illegal trading and by threatening to sue SCB if it failed to comply with his
demand. Upon learning of Lee's actions in Hong Kong, the SEC sought, and
the U.S. district court ordered, an injunction against Lee filing suit, other than
in the Southern District of New York, relating to his assets ("anti-suit
injunction"). Based on SCB's continued refusal to comply with Lee's demand
for payment, Lee brought an action in Hong Kong against SCB, and applied
to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong for a declaration that the U.S. order
freezing his assets did not restrain SCB from complying with his demands for
payment.
In light of Lee's open defiance of its orders, including the anti-suit
injunction, upon the motion by the SEC, the U.S. district court held a hearing
to decide whether SCB's New York branch should be required to pay Lee's
allegedly ill-gotten gains into the U.S. court registry. The SEC argued that it
was necessary to sequester the funds in the registry to protect the investors
allegedly defrauded in the insider trading scheme. SCB contended that the
court had no jurisdiction to require the payment of funds held in its Hong
Kong branch. The court held that it had jurisdiction over Lee, who had
traded in the United States and had been served with the SEC's summons and
complaint, and that the funds in question represented Lee's illicit profits.
Accordingly, the court issued an order on August 11, 1988, directing SCB to
pay monies into the registry of the court from accounts controlled by Lee
("sequestration order"). SCB complied with the order but filed a notice of
appeal.
Lee continued to press his claims against SCB in the Hong Kong Supreme
Court. On September 22, 1988, the Hong Kong court, after a hearing on the
matter, issued an order denying Lee's application for a declaratory order
against SCB. 15 Following a line of reasoning offered by the bank, the Hong
Kong court concluded that SCB might be holding the funds as a constructive
trustee for the benefit of investors defrauded by Wang and Lee, that such
investors were the beneficial owners of the funds, and that Lee's companies
were, therefore, not entitled to delivery of the funds.
In light of the Hong Kong court's decision that the funds appeared to be
beneficially owned by investors, SCB's arguments on appeal appeared hollow.
Nonetheless, SCB argued that because the Hong Kong court did not fully
recognize the effect of the U.S. court order, but instead recognized the
possibility of a constructive trust, the U.S. court's sequestration order in effect
subjected the bank to double liability, under which it could be required to
make payments both in Hong Kong and New York. Accordingly, SCB and
15. See Nanus Asia Co., Inc. v SCB, Misc Proc No 1459 (S Ct Hong Kong Sept 22, 1988);
Southridge Intl. Inc. v SCB, Misc Proc No 1460 (S Ct Hong Kong Sept 22, 1988). According to the
SEC, the plaintiffs in the related actions were Lee's corporate alter egos. See Brief of SEC
(Appellee), Civ Nos 88-6236, 6316 (May 1989).
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amici' 6 contended that the order was an unconstitutional attachment or
garnishment of SCB's own funds, running afoul of international law and
upsetting settled practices of the international banking community. In
particular, SCB alleged that the U.S. district court order violated the separate
entity doctrine' 7 because the order ran to a different branch than the one at
which the subject account was opened. Finally, SCB challenged the U.S.
district court's authority to issue a garnishment order that, in SCB's view,
garnished a debt localized in Hong Kong. i8
In opposition, the SEC argued that the order did not impose any risk of
double liability because it was in the nature of an equitable sequestration,
which did not impose a lien on the sequestered property or affect its title.
The SEC further argued that the district court did not garnish property, but
rather issued in personam orders to the person controlling the money, Mr.
Lee, which were necessary under the facts presented to give full effect to a
final decree. Citing United States v. First National City Bank, 19 the SEC argued
that such in personam orders were within the scope of the court's equitable
jurisdiction in government enforcement actions. The SEC also contended
that, when viewed properly, the order did not impermissibly infringe on Hong
Kong sovereignty, violate international law, or upset settled practices of the
international banking community, because the subjects of the order were Mr.
Lee and the bank's New York branch, both of whom had control over the
funds in question, and over whom the court had personal jurisdiction. 20 The
U.S. appellate court never had an opportunity to rule on these issues. In
16. The amici included the United Kingdom, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the New
York Clearing House Association, and the Institute of International Bankers and Foreign Bankers'
Association. Brief of the Appeal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae, SEC v Wang, 699 F Supp 44 (SD NY 1988), appeal docketed, Nos
88-6236, 88-6316 (2d Cir May 27, 1989); Brief of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Amici
Curiae, SEC v Wang, 699 F Supp 44 (SD NY 1988), appeal docketed, Nos 88-6236, 88-6316 (2d Cir
May 27, 1989); Brief of the New York Clearing House Association, The Institute of International
Bankers and Foreign Bankers Associations as Amici Curiae, SEC v Wang, 699 F Supp 44 (SD NY
1988), appeal docketed, Nos 88-6236, 88-6316 (2d Cir May 27, 1989).
17. See note 13.
18. While the order was on appeal, the SEC filed a motion for remand, or, alternatively, for
supplementation of the record, based on documents, including account-opening agreements, that
were produced by SCB after the district court's ruling. The SEC asserted that the documents
demonstrated that Lee had the right to make withdrawals from any SCB branch, including New York.
Therefore, the SEC argued, SCB's assertion that the bank account at issue was in Hong Kong and its
concerns about the extraterritorial effect of the U.S. district court's order were without foundation.
The SEC further asserted that the documents provided evidence pertaining to the authority of the
U.S. court to affect the SCB accounts and that a remand was necessary to permit further discovery
and the entry of additional findings by the district court. SEC Motion for Remand, or alternatively
for Supplementation of the Record, SEC v Wang, 699 F Supp 44 (SD NY 1988). In an order dated
April 13, 1989, a motions panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the SEC's
motion, concluding that remand was inappropriate, prior to the bank's opportunity to argue the
merits of its appeal. The court further noted that after the appeal was heard, the merits panel would
be in a better position to decide whether to affirm or reverse on the existing record or remand for
further proceedings.
19. 379 US 378, 383 (1965).
20. With respect to certain funds that Lee attempted to transfer outside the United States
immediately prior to the time the SEC obtained the freeze order, the SEC argued that it was in "hot
pursuit" of these funds, and its ability to preserve assets should not be thwarted by the fortuity of the
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August 1989, while the appeal was pending, Lee consented to the entry of a
Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction, which included his surrender of
$25,150,000.21 On August 2, 1989, SCB and the SEC jointly moved for
voluntary dismissal of SCB's appeal; the Second Circuit granted the parties'
motion. Due to Lee's settlement, the legal issues raised by Wang and Lee
remain unresolved. At this point, Wang and Lee illustrates an important
method that, in the absence of better alternatives, the SEC has used, and will
continue to use, to safeguard illicit profits within the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts until they can be returned to defrauded investors. The controversy
caused by the SEC's action in Wang and Lee also serves notice for the need to
develop the alternatives necessary to obtain similar results-the effective
freezing of a defendant's assets-while avoiding both the cost and uncertainty
of such case-by-case litigation.
B.

SEC v. Fondation Hai and SEC v. Unifund SAL

Market surveillance is conducted on a real-time basis; U.S. self-regulatory
22
organizations and the SEC can detect questionable trading almost instantly.
As a result, the SEC increasingly is aware of suspicious trading even before
the initial purchase transactions are cleared and, in insider trading cases,
often before the material event has been announced. In more recent cases,
this information has allowed the SEC to move quickly to freeze assets and
securities while they are still in the hands of U.S. brokerage firms, thus
avoiding the issues that arose in Wang and Lee. Such decisive action, however,
has raised new problems in cases where exigencies do not allow for a
complete investigation prior to seeking that assets be frozen. In particular,
the need to complement domestic freeze orders with assistance from foreign
authorities illustrated by Wang and Lee is evidenced further by difficulties that
arose in SEC v. Fondation Hai 23 and SEC v. Unifund SAL. 2 4 In Fondation Hai,
the U.S. district court froze trading assets of foreign defendants within hours
of when the suspicious purchases were made. The defendants included
Lebanese and Panamanian entities and certain unknown persons, including
some who traded through Swiss bank accounts, who had purchased shares of
the Rorer Group, Inc., a U.S. company, prior to the public announcement of
Rorer's acquisition by Rhone-Poulenc, S.A., a French corporation. There had
been massive trading in Rorer securities prior to the public announcement of
the potential acquisition on January 15. On January 10 and 11, the volume of
options traded doubled from the prior day, and on January 12 was nearly ten
timing of a bank transfer in relation to a freeze order. See Brief of SEC (Appellee), Civ Nos 88-6236,
88-6316 (May 1989).

21. The total included approximately $19 million in alleged illicit profits. These funds are in the
process of being distributed to investors. See SEC v Wang, 944 F2d 80, 82 (2d Cir 1991) (affirming
approval of plan for distribution of disgorged funds).
22. Hearing before the Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 259 (1988) ("Barnard Report").
23. 736 F Supp 465 (SD NY 1990).
24. 910 F2d 1028 (2d Cir 1990).
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times the average daily volume in the prior month. Moreover, the volume of
shares traded on January 12 was six times the average daily volume of the
previous twenty days. Several defendants' purchases vastly exceeded
securities purchases that they had made previously. 2 5 The U.S. district court
granted the SEC's application for provisional relief, including freeze orders.
Two defendants appealed from the court's entry of preliminary injunctions.
The Second Circuit affirmed, with modifications, the district court's freeze
orders, directing, however, that the modified freeze orders terminate thirty
days after the issuance of its mandate unless the SEC proceeded to trial.
In a petition for rehearing, the SEC argued that an injunction freezing the
defendant's assets should be maintained until all reasonable discovery was
completed. 26 The SEC highlighted the difficulties and delays inherent in
obtaining evidence from foreign jurisdictions, 2 7 and argued that the Second
Circuit's limitation on the duration of the freeze order would deprive the SEC
of a fair opportunity to make a definite showing of likelihood of success on the
merits prior to expiration of the freeze. The SEC also stated that such a
limited-duration freeze might seriously hamper effective prosecution of
international insider trading cases, and could undermine international
enforcement cooperation. In this regard, the SEC filed an affidavit outlining
the extensive efforts it had undertaken, and that were still pending, to obtain
evidence. In particular, the SEC had made several requests to France under
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters ("Hague Evidence Convention"),2 8 as well as requests to
Switzerland pursuant to a criminal mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT"). 29
The petition for a rehearing was denied. 30
Although the SEC, with the assistance of French and Swiss authorities, was
able to gather substantial evidence abroad, it was unable to complete foreignbased discovery in the thirty-day time frame established by the Second
Circuit. Consequently, the SEC did not have the opportunity to make a
25. See SEC's Memorandum in Support of a Motion for (1) Preliminary Injunction, (2) An
Order Freezing Assets, and (3) An Order Preventing Alteration or Destruction of Documents. 90 Civ
0277 (Feb 10, 1990) (SWK).
26. The SEC argued that the freeze order should be extended based upon a showing that there
existed "serious questions of fact or law going to the merits so as to make a fair ground for
litigation"-a standard for injunctive relief that is available in private litigation as long as the plaintiff
can show irreparable injury. See, for example, Hamilton Watch Co. v Benrus Watch Co., 206 F2d 738,
740 (2d Cir 1953). The court, noting that the SEC is not required to show irreparable injury, held
the SEC to the higher standard of a "likelihood of success on the merits." Court Order (Aug 3,
1990).
27. In support of its motion, the SEC filed affidavits of the U.S. Department ofJustice, the U.S.
State Department, and the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters, which is the Swiss authority
responsible for implementing the criminal mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States
and Switzerland. The affidavits all noted the delays inherent in obtaining foreign-based evidence and
that the imposition of unreasonable discovery deadlines in these types of cases could have
deleterious effects on achieving international cooperation. Exhibits to Petition of SEC (appellee) for
Rehearing as to Duration of Freeze Orders, Civ Nos 90-6057, 6091, 6093, 6103 (Aug 3, 1990).
28. [1972] 23 UST 2555, TIAS No 7444 (1970).
29. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Untied States and Switzerland,
[1976] 27 UST 2019, TIAS No 8302 (1977).
30. Denied by Court Order, Oct 23, 1990.
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definite showing of likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, prior to
the completion of foreign discovery, the court released approximately $2
million of one defendant's assets that had been frozen at a U.S. brokerage
3 1

firm.

FondationHai has complicated the SEC's task of preserving ill-gotten gains
while it pursues complex international frauds. 32 When considered in
conjunction with the issues raised in Wang and Lee, absent a change in the
standard for freeze orders in the United States, the need to develop avenues
for assisting foreign regulators is all the more apparent.
C.

SEC v. Antar

The Antar case illustrates problems that can arise when an alleged
securities law violator flees the United States with his assets to avoid the
execution of a judgment. The success that the SEC ultimately had in finding
and blocking Antar's ill-gotten gains demonstrates the importance of
developing and enhancing arrangements for the execution of judgments.
In 1990, the SEC sued Eddie Antar, the founder and former Chairman,
President, and Chief Executive Officer of Crazy Eddies, Inc. The SEC alleged,
among other things, that he defrauded investors by fraudulently
31. Fondation Hai may make it more difficult to maintain asset freezes in the United States in
cases involving protracted foreign discovery because it may allow foreign defendants to control the
timing of when a case goes to trial. In other recent cases described below, foreign defendants have
refused to identify themselves or otherwise appear absent the SEC's use of international agreements
to learn their identities. In response, the SEC has sought default judgments against such defendants,
while continuing to pursue their identities under foreign information-sharing agreements. This
approach ensures that the defendant who chooses to frustrate SEC efforts to litigate a case by staying
outside the U.S. jurisdiction cannot control the timing for his entry of an appearance.
In 1991, the SEC obtained default judgments in two cases involving foreign-based insider
trading, where the disgorgement of over $3 million was ordered. SEC v FinacorAnstalt, and Certain
Purchasersof Call Optionsfor the Common Stock of Combustion Engineering, Inc., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed
Secur L Rptr
96,272 (SD NY 1991) (default judgments obtained against unknown purchasers
trading through banks in the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg); SEC v Heider, [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr
95,651 (SD NY 1990). The SEC was successful in identifying the
unknown purchasers who traded through foreign bank accounts and later named those purchasers as
defendants in the SEC action. See, for example, SEC v Norgren, 89 Civ 7667 (IMC), Litigation Rel No
13410 (Oct 15, 1992). In Heider, the SEC obtained default judgments against certain foreign
defendants trading through accounts in Switzerland, Germany, and Luxembourg in the securities of
Contel Corporation ("Contel") prior to the July 12, 1990 public announcement of an intended
merger between Contel and GTE Corporation. The SEC detected unusually heavy trading in the
securities of Contel during the days preceding the merger announcement, and the SEC filed a civil
injunctive action the day after the merger announcement. Some of the unknown purchasers bought
Contel securities through Swiss banks that, citing Swiss secrecy laws, refused to identify their
customers. Rather than identify themselves and defend the action, some of these defendants had
attempted to delay the processing of the SEC's request for assistance to the Swiss government, and
the SEC obtained a default judgment as to those defendants. See Michael D. Mann & Lise A.
Lustgarten, Internationalizationof Insider Trading Enforcement-A Guide to Regulation and Cooperation 17-18
(American Bar Association, 1991).
32. One paper notes that, in the event Fondation Hai affects the SEC's ability to seek expedited
judicial relief in the United States against perceived violations of U.S. insider trading laws, the SEC
will need to rely more heavily upon cooperation from foreign authorities to assist in the enforcement
of U.S. securities laws. See Gary G. Lynch & Sheila W. Sawyer, SEC Injunctive Actions Against Unknown
Purchasers in Insider Trading Cases 16 (Oct 12, 1990) (paper presented at the Twenty-Third Annual
Rocky Mountain State, Federal and Provincial Securities Conference).
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misrepresenting the financial condition of the company and engaging in
insider trading.3 3 Prior to the issuance of a final judgment against Antar, the
U.S. court ordered that he repatriate trading profits of over $52 million, which
had previously been transferred to Israel. Antar chose to flee the U.S.
instead, depriving the court, for the time being, of any direct method to force
him to repatriate his ill-gotten gains. 3 4 Shortly thereafter, the court entered a
judgment of over $70 million against Antar, and appointed a trustee-receiver
to take possession of all of Antar's property.
To gather information to determine a means to enforce the U.S. court's
judgment, the SEC requested from Israel, under the Hague Convention,
information concerning Antar's initial transfer to Israel. Based on the
responses from Israel, the SEC learned that some of the profits had been
transferred to Switzerland. The SEC, through the U.S. Justice Department,
then made requests to Switzerland pursuant to the Swiss treaty.3 5 In
connection with the Swiss Treaty request, a substantial amount of Antar's
illegal profits were frozen at Swiss banks.
The case could be considered a success at this point to the extent that,
through the use of the information obtained under the Hague Evidence
Convention and the Swiss Treaty, Antar was deprived of the use of those
funds. Because the Swiss freeze denied Antar access to the money, it forced
him to come forward. Antar, using one of his false names, personally visited
the Swiss authorities in an effort to convince them to release his money. That
move by Antar proved his undoing.3 6 Using information obtained from the
Swiss authorities, Antar was located and on June 24, 1992, at the request of
U.S. authorities, Antar was arrested in Israel.3 7 Thereafter, the SEC obtained
hundreds of documents Antar possessed at the time of his arrest.3 8 The
documents revealed the location of some of Antar's assets and some of the
33.

In the 1980s, Crazy Eddie was the largest retail electronics chain in the New York City area.

See SEC v Antar, Litigation Rel No 12548 [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 95,341
(D NJ 1990).
34. Antar was also the subject of a criminal investigation. In the summer of 1992, a grand jury
in New Jersey handed down an indictment charging Antar with, among other things, fraudulently
inflating Crazy Eddie's inventory, making false filings with the SEC, and obstruction ofjustice. See
Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of NewJersey (June 24, 1992). A superseding
indictment, which included charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Law,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988), was issued in August 1992. See Proceedings Allowed to Begin in
Jerusalem on Antar Extradition, Wall StJ A16 col 2 (Aug 25, 1992).

35. As described on pages 323-24, the treaties may provide a mechanism for certain illegally
obtained proceeds to be frozen.
36. Barry Meier, Crazy Eddie's Insane Odyssey, NY Times CI col 5 (July 19, 1992)
37. Michael Roem, Crazy Eddie nabbed in Yavne by Police, Jerusalem Post 1 sec 3 col 2 (June 25,
1992).
38. Upon the motion of the SEC, the U.S. district court issued a Hague Evidence request to
Israel for access to the documents seized by the Israeli police. In Israel, Antar objected to the
processing of the Hague Evidence request. He argued that the Hague Evidence Convention was
preempted by the U.S.-Israel extradition treaty and that the Hague Evidence Convention was
impermissibly used to enforce ajudgment. See Hague Evidence Convention, art 1 (cited in note 28).
Antar claimed that because a final judgment had been issued in the United States, the judicial
proceedings in the United States had been completed. Therefore, the information sought was not in
connection with a "judicial proceeding commenced or contemplated," and the request should be
rejected. In addition, Antar argued that the request for information was impermissible because it
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aliases under which they were kept. By making requests to its counterparts in
other countries,3 9 the SEC was able to locate and freeze millions of dollars
before Antar was able to dissipate them. In addition, the SEC or the U.S.
court-appointed trustee-receiver has filed actions to enforce the final
40
judgment against Antar, such as in Israel.
As of the writing of this article, the case against Antar and recovery of his
assets is still developing. Information-sharing mechanisms played a key role
in identifying and tracking Antar's illegally obtained assets. Through use of
ad hoc efforts, the SEC was able to piece together a net to prevent the
dissipation of these assets. Had comprehensive arrangements to enforce
judgments been in place, these efforts would have been both simplified and
made more certain. Most importantly, they would have provided the SEC
with a needed edge in the race to control illegally obtained assets.
D.

United Kingdom Cases

The SEC is not alone in its ability or commitment to utilize unilateral
measures to enforce final or ancillary provisional measures in connection with
securities cases. For example, securities authorities in the United Kingdom
have the power to seek provisional court orders where necessary to preserve
assets for return to investors. 4 ' In addition, U.K. courts have similarly faced
issues involving the extraterritorial enforcement of court orders designed to
was being sought for a judicial act-the issuance of process by which judgments or orders are
executed-that was expressly excluded from the scope of the Hague Evidence Convention.
The SEC argued that the matter was still pending before the U.S. courts to the extent the U.S.
judge had jurisdiction to determine whether further relief should be granted against Antar or others,
and to the extent the court-appointed trustee/receiver had equitable jurisdiction to recover Antar's
assets. In addition, the request to the Israeli court was for information and evidence only; the U.S.
court was not requesting the execution of the judgment against Antar under the Hague Evidence
Convention.
On August 5, 1992, Judge Miriam Divon of the Magistrates Court of Tel Aviv rejected Antar's
claims. In her opinion she agreed with the SEC's position that U.S. proceedings were still pending to
the extent that the U.S. court retained jurisdiction to implement the judgment and a receivership,
and therefore it was appropriate to seek the information under the Hague Evidence Convention. See
The Applicant Judicial Authority, United States District Court, District of New Jersey, USA v Eddie
Antar, Magistrates Court of Tel Aviv, Judge M. Dixon (Aug 5, 1992). Note that Antar had sought a
stay of execution of the order, pending the filing of an appeal. The judge also denied this request,
stating that "Every day and every hour is important to prevent Eddie Antar or his representatives ...
from effecting an operation that would frustrate the application of the American Securities and
Exchange Commission to place its hands on the money and property under Eddie Antar's control."
The SEC was granted access to the seized documents while Antar's objections were pending.
39. Although all of these efforts have not yet been identified publicly, it has been reported that
the Commission des Valuers Mobilieres du Quebec imposed a freeze on Antar's accounts in Canada
for over $1 million pursuant to an SEC request for assistance under the Canadian MOU. This was
the first time that the SEC had sought a freeze of accounts under the MOU. In addition, the
Commission des Operations de Bourse of France provided the SEC with assistance in obtaining
documents and assets located in France that had been maintained at French banks in the name of
Antar's wife. See SEC's Memorandum in Opposition to Eddie Antar's Motion to Vacate the Final
Judgment (Nov*9, 1992).
40. Unlike Wang and Lee, the SEC already had secured a final judgment against Antar when it
sought to freeze and recover illegal proceeds.
41. See Financial Services Act ("FSA") 1986 ch II, § 61(i) (Eng.). Securities authorities in
France also have the power to seek provisional court orders to preserve assets for the benefit of
investors. See Law No 89-531 8-1, art 12-2 (1989) (Fr). The Commission des Operations de Bourse
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preserve assets for return to defrauded investors. Moreover, the United
Kingdom approach has likewise been criticized because of the uncertainties
created by attempts to hold entities that are within the jurisdiction of the
court responsible for ill-gotten gains located outside of the country. 4 2
Nonetheless, the U.K. courts have also recognized that, in the absence of a
better mechanism, it is crucial for a court with jurisdiction over the matter to
act to preserve the availability of relief.
U.K. courts have granted applications for extraterritorial Mareva
injunctions (ex parte provisional relief orders) 43 to the United Kingdom's
Securities and Investments Board ("SIB"). 44 For example, in SIB v. Pantell,
S.A. ,45 the SIB was granted a Mareva injunction in connection with an action
commenced under Section 61(i) of the Financial Services Act ("FSA"), 4 6
restraining the defendant, a company registered in Switzerland, and its parent
company, from dissipating any of their assets within the jurisdiction of the
court or in the Channel Islands. 4 7 U.K. authorities had begun investigating
Pantell for, among other things, conducting an unauthorized investment
business in the United Kingdom, and had discussions with Pantell's counsel,
in which counsel admitted that Pantell's activities violated U.K. law and stated
that Pantell would cease its activities in the United Kingdom.
Swiss authorities then informed U.K. authorities that the Swiss planned to
close down Pantell because of violations of Swiss law, and that they had
discovered that Pantell had obtained funds from, and done business with,
U.K. investors. Furthermore, Swiss authorities disclosed that they had traced
some of Pantell's assets to Barclays Bank in the United Kingdom. The SIB
("COB") also has the power to ask that a judge take protective measures on behalf of a foreign
securities authority. See Santiago Report at 18 (cited in note 1).
42. See, for example, Ali Malek and Caroline Lewis, Worldwide Mareva Injunctions: The Position of
InternationalBanks, Lloyd's Marit and Comm L Q88 (Feb 1990).
43. See Albert V. Dicey & John H.C. Morris, Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws 192-94
(Stevens & Sons, 11 th ed 1987). See also Lawrence Collins, The TerritorialReach of Mareva Injunctions,
105 L Q Rev 262 (1989).
44. The SIB was the first self-regulatory organization ("SRO") designated by the United
Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") under the Financial Services Act ("FSA").
45. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division (Mar 8, 1989).
46. Section 61(i) of the FSA provides among other things:
(1) If on the application of the Secretary of State the court is satisfied(a) that there is a reasonable likelihood that any person will contravene [specific
provisions of the FSA or of the rules of certain SROs or similar professional bodies];
(b) that any person has contravened [such provision and rules] and that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the contravention will continue or be repeated; or
(c) that any person has contravened any such provision or condition and that there are
steps that could be taken for remedying the contravention,
the court may grant an injunction restraining the contravention.., as the case may be, make
an order requiring that person and any other person who appears to the court to have been
knowingly concerned in the contravention to take such steps as the court may direct to
remedy it.
FSA ch II, § 61 (i).
47. The Channel Islands are located off the southern coast of England. They are not a part of
the United Kingdom, nor are they sovereign states or colonies. They have their own legislatures,
judiciary, and executives, but the United Kingdom is responsible for their defense and international
relations.
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then learned that Pantell had given Barclays Bank standing orders to transfer
8
assets from the U.K. branch to an affiliate account in Guernsey Island. 4
The SIB brought an action under the FSA to ensure that Pantell's assets
would not be dissipated before the court rendered a final determination of
whether Pantell had conducted an unauthorized investment business in the
United Kingdom. Previously, Mareva injunctions had been granted only to
individuals suing under a private right of action. 49 In Pantell, the U.K. court
concluded that Section 61 of the FSA conferred upon the SIB a statutory right
of action for the benefit of investors, including the right to obtain Mareva
relief to prevent a defendant from dissipating assets.
Pursuant to a court's order in issuing a Mareva injunction, a U.K. bank,
having received service of the order, is required to ensure that funds held at
other branches of the bank, wherever located, are not dissipated. 50
Therefore, similar to the U.S. court's order in Wang and Lee, the U.K. court's
order in Pantell explicitly blocked the defendant's assets held in branches of
U.K. banks outside of the United Kingdom. Again, as with Wang and Lee,
commentators have argued that subjecting banks within the jurisdiction of the
court to this type of duty creates uncertainty and may expose banks to double
5
liability. '
Wang and Lee and Pantell illustrate that the SEC, SIB, and other securities
authorities will use aggressive means to block and obtain the ill-gotten gains
of securities law violators, even when an international embroglio can arise
where circumstances dictate that action must be taken on a unilateral basis.
Fondation Hai and Antar demonstrate, however, that judicial unwillingness to
freeze assets for a sufficient period of time, or the surreptitious actions of a
defendant, can frustrate the recovery of funds for the benefit of defrauded
investors.
48. Guernsey Island is one of the Channel Islands.
49. See generally Collins, 105 L Q Rev 262 (cited in note 43).
50. As more fully described in Collins, id, U.K. courts previously had excluded third parties
from the operation of an order affecting foreign assets based on the theory that it was improper to
subject acts taken abroad to actions for contempt. See Babanaft Intl. Co. S.A. v Bassatne, [ 1989] 2 WLR
232. In Pantell, however, the court adopted the proviso in Derby & Co. Ltd. v Weldon (Nos 3 and 4),
[1989] 2 WLR 412, which states that to the extent the court order purported to have an
extraterritorial effect, no person shall
be affected ... or concerned with the terms thereof until it shall be declared enforceable or
be enforced by a foreign court ... unless that person is . . . subject to the jurisdiction of this
court and who: (i) had been given written notice of the this order.. . within the jurisdiction;
and (ii) is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which assist
in the breach of the terms of this order.
Derby & Co., Ltd., [1989] 2 WLR at 429. Collins notes that this proviso may have been drafted, in
part, to "give a justification to an English bank which might wish to support the court in its efforts to
prevent the defendant from frustrating the due course ofjustice." Collins, 105 L QRev at 285 (cited
in note 43).
51. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text. See Malek & Lewis, Lloyd's Marit & Comm L Qat
96-98 (cited in note 42). Note, however, that dicta in other U.K. court cases support the concept that
there may be a "hot pursuit" exception to potential infringements of sovereignty created by Mareva
injunctions. See London and Counties Securities (in liquidation) v Caplan (1978) (unreported) (discussed
in Malek & Lewis, Lloyd's Marit & Comm L Qat 94 (cited in note 42)); Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin
andJenrette Securities Corp., [1986] ch 482 (discussed in Collins, 105 L QRev at 285 (cited in note 43)).
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III
COOPERATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONFRONTATION

Currently there are no established international means for a securities
enforcement agency to ensure that an asset freeze will be honored by persons
and entities located outside of their jurisdiction. Since funds and securities
can be moved with relative ease, either physically or electronically, this gap in
the effectiveness of asset freezes is a dangerous one. However, satisfactory
cooperative means can be developed to fill that gap and thereby avoid a
repetition of the events that led to the sequestration order in Wang and Lee.
Impetus for the SEC's development of MOUs on the exchange of
information was generated by the international community's desire to avoid
the high-speed jurisdictional collisions caused by unilateral orders for the
production of foreign based information. An examination of the process that
generated the development of the first MOU between the United States and
Switzerland, as well as those that have followed, reveals an important model
for constructing alternatives for effectively freezing assets and executing final
judgments abroad.
A.

Pre-MOU Cases: BSI/St. Joe and Santa Fe

In 1981, the SEC brought two civil enforcement actions alleging insider
trading through foreign banks. 52 The first case filed, BSI/St. Joe, concerned
the acquisition of call options and common stock of St. Joe Minerals
Corporation ("St. Joe") through Banca Della Svizzera Italiana ("BSI"), prior
to the public announcement of a cash tender offer for St. Joe by a subsidiary
of Seagram Company Ltd. ("Seagram"). The SEC sought, among other
things, a TRO and an asset freeze. 5 3 After commencing the injunctive action,
the SEC tried unsuccessfully for eight months to determine the names of the
BSI customers. Finally, the SEC moved for an order to compel BSI's New
York branch to disclose its customers' names. BSI countered that such
disclosure would violate Swiss secrecy laws and subject it to civil and criminal
54
liability in Switzerland.
The court granted the SEC's motion and ordered BSI to disclose fully its
customers' identities. 55 Among other things, the court found that BSI had
made deliberate use of Swiss non-disclosure laws to evade the U.S. securities
laws on insider trading. 56 The court also noted the overwhelming interest of
the United States in this matter, stating:
52. SEC v Banca Della Svizzera Italianaand Certain Purchasersof Call Optionsfor the Common Stock of St.
Joe Minerals Corp. ("BSI/St. Joe"), 92 FRD 111 (SD NY 1981); SEC v Certain Unknown Purchasers of the
Common Stock of and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Intl. Corp. ("Santa Fe"), [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 99,424 (SD NY 1983).
53. BSI/St. Joe, 92 FRD at 113.
54. Id.
55. Id at 119. Before the court order was signed, BSI obtained a waiver of Swiss secrecy laws
from its customers. Id at 113.
56. Id at 118-19.
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The strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the
integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted. That interest is being
continually thwarted by the use of foreign bank accounts .... It would be a travesty of
justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets, violate American
laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself
57
and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign law.

Based on the U.S. court's discovery decision in BSI/St. Joe, the SEC was able
to pursue successfully the foreign purchasers, including both Giuseppe B.
Tome, who exploited a confidential relationship with Edgar M. Bronfman, the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Seagram's, and Paolo Mario Leati,
58
an Italian broker-dealer who was Tome's tippee.
Within days after it moved to compel disclosure in BSI/ St. Joe, the SEC
filed the second action, Santa Fe, an even larger insider trading case involving
five of the largest banks in Switzerland. Based on the timing and size of the
transaction, the SEC alleged that unknown purchasers had obtained profits of
over $7.8 million by illegally trading on inside information concerning a
takeover of the Santa Fe International Corporation ("Santa Fe") by Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. 59 The filing of Santa Fe, on the heels of precedent-setting
BSI/St. Joe, demonstrated that international insider trading cases raising the
issue of secrecy laws were not sporadic events. It was thus clear that absent a
credible alternative, the SEC would increasingly seek and obtain, by court
order if necessary, information identifying the persons who were the
beneficial owners of the securities purchased in the United States from the
banks acting as agents in the transactions.
B.

MOUs

BSI/St. Joe and Santa Fe provided the SEC and Swiss governmental
authorities, as well as the Swiss banks, with the impetus to develop a
cooperative mechanism that would address the most urgent problems
confronted by the SEC, as well as the concerns and legal constraints existing
61
in Switzerland. 60 The resulting mechanism, the 1982 MOU with the Swiss,
provided for the establishment of a separate private agreement among
members of the Swiss Bankers Association. 6 2 The agreement, known as
Convention XVI, provided that, in cases involving takeovers, where insider
57. Id at 117, 119.
58. See SEC v Tome, 638 F Supp 596 (SD NY 1986), aff'd 833 F2d 1081 (2d Cir 1987). See also
Michael D. Mann &Joseph G. Mari, Developments in InternationalSecurities Law Enforcement and Regulation
41, 58-70 (Oct 24, 1990) (paper presented at the Securities Regulation Seminar in Los Angeles,
California).
59. See Santa Fe, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 99,424.
60. Although the Swiss Treaty was in effect at the time these two cases were brought, see note
29, the Treaty contains a dual criminality requirement. Although provisions of Swiss law contained
prohibitions against some forms of insider trading, insider trading did not become illegal in
Switzerland until 1988. Thus, the Treaty was not available as an alternative mechanism.
61. MOU between the United States and Switzerland, 43 SEC Docket 141 (Aug 31, 1982).
62. Since insider trading was not illegal per se in Switzerland, and because the MOU was
implemented by the private agreement, there was no legal mechanism available for piercing Swiss
secrecy law. Accordingly, the Swiss banks obtained express waivers of the secrecy provisions from
their customers, conditioned on the terms of the MOU and the private agreement.
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trading was suspected, the signatory banks would disclose and furnish
information to the SEC without violating Swiss bank secrecy laws. 63 Under

Convention XVI, a three-member commission appointed by the Swiss
authorities would examine the SEC's requests and determine whether the
MOU's thresholds were met to warrant release of the information or a freeze
of assets. 6 4 Thereafter, the information was provided through the Swiss
65
government to the SEC.

While the 1982 MOU with Switzerland was effective in prosecuting insider
trading cases involving trading through Swiss banks, its utility was limited
since it had been tailored very narrowly to address the particular concerns
raised by BSI/St. Joe and Santa Fe : insider trading through bank accounts.
Based on its experiences under the 1982 Swiss MOU, the SEC sought to
develop more comprehensive relationships with other foreign securities
authorities. In 1986, the SEC entered into MOUs with regulators
representing the world's largest capital markets: the United Kingdom and
Japan. 66 Both MOUs established a substantially broader scope of cases for
which assistance could be obtained. The MOU with the United Kingdom's
Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI"), for example, includes assistance
in matters relating to market conduct and investment businesses. In addition
to providing assistance in particular cases, the MOUs with the United
Kingdom and Japan help to provide a more regular and formal mechanism for
communications about all securities matters between the signatories by
designating certain contact persons.
The SEC further broadened its approach to MOUs and the effect of MOUs
in 1988 with the signing of understandings with securities regulators in three
Canadian provinces and Brazil. 6 7 These MOUs were designed to cover
virtually all offenses that could occur under the federal securities laws and
provide for the fullest degree of assistance possible, including providing
access to information in agency files and obtaining documents and testimony.
Until 1988, assistance available under the MOUs was limited to that which
could be provided through the best efforts of regulators. At the time, most
regulators, including the SEC, were not authorized to use their compulsory
63. Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with regard to the handling of requests for information
from the SEC on the subject of misuse of inside information, 43 SEC Docket 155 (July 14, 1982).
64. The MOU with Switzerland established objective standards for transactions and price
movements for determining whether its mechanism was available for a particular case.
65. For a more detailed description of Convention XVI, as well as the development of an MOU
in 1987 and the exchange of diplomatic notes, see Mann & Mar, Developments at 58-70 (cited in note
58).
66. MOU on Exchange of Information Between the SEC and the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry
("D TI") in Matters Relating to Securities and Between the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
U.K. DTI in Matters Relating to Futures, 43 SEC Docket 176 (Sept 23, 1986); Memorandum of the SEC and
the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information, 43 SEC Docket 184
(May 23, 1986).
67. MOU between the SEC and the Ontario Securities Commission, the Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du
Quebec and the British Columbia Securities Commission, 43 SEC Docket 186 (Jan 7, 1988); MOU between the
SEC and the Brazil Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios, 43 SEC Docket 206 (Jan 12, 1990).
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powers to assist foreign authorities. 68 In 1988, however, Congress authorized
the SEC to compel the production of evidence and testimony at the request of
a foreign authority, without regard to whether the matter under investigation
by that authority would constitute a violation of U.S. securities laws. 69 At the
time the legislation was adopted, Congress clearly envisioned that it would
provide a strong incentive for countries to agree to provide the SEC with
similar assistance. This goal has been achieved; the granting of this new
authority to the SEC, combined with the commitment of the Canadian and
Brazilian regulators to provide similar assistance or to seek similar authority,
set the course for a new generation of MOUs. Since 1988, numerous
countries have enacted similar legislation to allow for the implementation of
MOUs that are broad in both scope of cases covered and range of assistance
70
available.
An indication of the growth of international cooperation in light of these,
and other, developments has been the increase in the number of requests for
assistance made by the SEC to foreign governments, and of requests made to
the SEC. 7 1 In connection with these requests, the SEC has exercised its
68. For example, § 21 (a) of the Exchange Act, in its original version, limited the SEC's ability to
investigate violations of "this Title." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 48 Stat 899. The
other securities laws contained similar provisions. See Mann & Mari, Developments at 78, 81 (cited in
note 58).
69. See Exchange Act § 21 (a)(2), 102 Stat at 4677. The SEC obtained the authority necessary to
implement fully these agreements under § 6 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, which added § 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-704, 102 Stat 4677 (1988), codified at 15

USC § 7 8u(a) (Supp 1989).

70. See Senate Report on the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988, S
Rep No 100-461, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1988). Since the adoption of § 21(a)(2), several other
countries have proposed and adopted legislation authorizing the use of compulsory powers at the
request of a foreign securities authority. In 1989, the French Law of August 2 was adopted; the COB
is now authorized to use compulsory powers on behalf of a foreign securities authority. Law No 89531 8-1, art 12-2 (1989) (Fr). In 1989, the U.K. Companies Act was modified to provide the U.K.
Secretary of State for the DTI to assist overseas regulators. 1989 U.K. Companies Act Section 82.
The SEC and U.K. authorities entered into an expanded MOU that encompasses the use of these

new powers on September 25, 1991. See note 68. In the summer of 1990, the Japanese Diet
adopted Section 184-2 of the Securities Exchange Law, which provides that the Minister of Finance
of Japan may, at the request of a foreign regulator, use certain compulsory methods to collect and
transmit information. Japanese Law Article 184-2 of the Securities and Exchange Law. The law
requires, among other things, that such assistance be conditioned upon the availability of reciprocal
assistance to Japan. The SEC is also working to expand the SEC-Japan MOU to encompass the use
of compulsory measures. See also Kingdom of the Netherlands, Regulation for the Supervision of
Trading in Securities (1992).
71. For example, in fiscal year 1989, the SEC "made 101 formal requests to foreign authorities
for assistance and received 150 requests from foreign authorities." 1989 SEC Annual Report at 1.
In fiscal year 1990, the SEC made over 160 requests to foreign authorities and received a substantial
number as well. 1990 SEC Annual Report at 4.
In fiscal year 1990, many SEC insider trading cases involved foreign elements; the SEC has made
requests to foreign authorities in connection with these cases. See, for example, Finacor Anstalt,
[1991 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 96,272 (SD NY 1991); Fondation Hai, 736 F Supp
465; Heider, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 95,651 (SD NY 1990). In
Finacor Anstalt, the SEC instituted actions against individuals who allegedly earned $3 million in
insider trading profits through institutions in Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands.
Penny stock cases also have international dimensions. For example, in 1989, the SEC brought an
action against Arnold Kimmes, who, together with certain confederates, conducted offerings in
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powers under Section 21(a)(2) on behalf of several foreign securities
authorities. Similarly, pursuant to requests from the SEC, foreign securities
authorities have used their compulsory powers on behalf of the SEC. In
response to the success of information-sharing MOUs (as demonstrated by
the successful prosecution of securities cases with international elements) as
well as the role of MOUs as foundations for harmonization and mutual
recognition initiatives, more and more securities authorities are entering into
72
MOUs with the SEC.

C.

MOUs as an Analogy for Cooperation in Enforcing Judgments and
Provisional Measures

The SEC's experience with MOUs provides an important analogy when
fashioning a mechanism for blocking and obtaining illicit gains, especially in
light of the many benefits to MOUs. The MOU approach has proven itself an
effective means for enhancing the SEC's evidence gathering ability for a
variety of reasons:
MOUs generally are negotiated with counterparties with direct
responsibility for regulating and administering domestic securities
markets. As a result, requests made under MOUs can be executed by
parties with expertise in securities matters, and who have an ongoing
working relationship with the SEC on securities matters generally.
numerous penny stocks and manipulated the aftermarket for such stocks. This group defrauded
investors in the United States, France, Switzerland, and other countries out of millions of dollars.
SEC v Kimmes, 89 Civ 5942 (ND Ill 1989). See also SEC v InternationalSwiss Investments Corp., Litigation
Rel No 11704 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
93,710 (WD Wash 1988), aff'd
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
94,926 (9th Cir 1990).
72. To date, the SEC has entered into 14 agreements or communiques on the exchange of
information. See MOU between the United States and Switzerland, 43 SEC Docket 141 (Aug 31, 1982);
Memorandum of the SEC and the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of
Information, 43 SEC Docket 184 (May 23, 1986); MOU on Exchange of Information between the SEC and the
U.K. DTI in matters relating to Securities and between the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the
U.K. DTI in matters relating to Futures, 43 SEC Docket 176 (Sept 23, 1986); MOU between the SEC and the
Ontario Securities Commission, the Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec and the British Columbia
Securities Commission, 43 SEC Docket 186 (Jan 7, 1988); MOU between the SEC and the Brazil Comissao de"
Valores Mobiliarios, 43 SEC Docket 206 (July 1, 1988); Communique on Exchange of Information between the
SEC and the Commissione Nazionale per Le Societa e la Borsa ("CONSOB ") of Italy, 44 SEC Docket 1319
(Sept 26, 1989); Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in the Exchange of Information in Securities Matters, 45 SEC Docket 715 (Jan 12,
1990); Administrative Agreement between the SEC and the Republique Francaise, Commission des Operations de
Bourse, 45 SEC Docket 726 (Jan 12, 1990); MOU between the SEC and the Comision Nacional de Valores of
Mexico on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual Assistance for the Exchange of Information, 47 SEC
Docket 716 (Oct 18, 1990); Communique on the Exchange of Information and the Establishment of a Framework
for Cooperation between the SEC and the Swedish Bank Inspection Board, 49 SEC Docket 472 (June 27, 1991);
MOU between the SEC and the Norway Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission Concerning Consultation
and Cooperation in the Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws, 49 SEC Docket 1462 (Sept 30,
1991); Communique between the SEC and the Costa Rican Comision Nacional De Valores on the Provision of
Technical Assistancefor the Development of the Costa Rican Securities Markets, the Exchange of Information, and
the Establishment of a Framework for Cooperation, 49 SEC Docket 1644 (Oct 16, 1991); MOU between the
SEC and the Comision Nacional De Valores of Argentina on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual
Assistancefor the Exchange of Information, 50 SEC Docket 674 (Dec 18, 1991); MOU between the SEC and
the Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores of Spain Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the
Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws (July 8, 1992).
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MOUs are non-binding statements of intent that are implemented by
generic domestic legislation. As a result, a formula for MOUs can be
developed that is consistent with the legislation, and then MOUs can
be negotiated with all willing regulators.
MOUs can be negotiated to reflect the full extent to which each
authority is willing and able to assist the other pursuant to domestic
law. For example, the U.K. MOU, as well as those of other countries,
takes into account the jurisdictional differences between securities
authorities in foreign countries.
MOUs provide authorities with predictability regarding the scope of
assistance available, and the manner in which assistance will be
provided. While unilateral measures such as court-ordered
extraterritorial measures can be effective, they are subject to a caseby-case review by a court.
The SEC and its foreign counterparts have developed MOUs based on
their recognition that they must be able to investigate effectively matters
involving foreign conduct to enforce domestic securities laws. In the area of
enforcement ofjudgments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan
have already expressed the view that means should be developed to enhance
cooperation. 73 The MOU approach, implemented by legislation, may well
provide a viable method for achieving this end.
IV
INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING JUDGMENTS

The development of international mechanisms for the enforcement of
judgments has already begun. These mechanisms involve drug trafficking and
money laundering, areas in which there is a well developed international view
that every country must assist in efforts to seize the fruits of these areas of
crime.7 4 Moreover, as the European Community legal systems begin to
integrate, efforts are being made to remove existing impediments to the
execution of judgments.
That these mechanism have already been put into place proves that
domestic authorities are willing to consider taking the steps necessary to assist
foreign authorities and that international agreements on enforcing judgments
and provisional measures can be negotiated and implemented. The approach
73. Trilateral Communique on Cooperation between the SEC, the DTI and the SIB of the United Kingdom,
and the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan, 47 SEC Docket 373 (Oct 1, 1990).
74. There also are conventions on the enforcement of arbitral awards. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, [1970] 21 UST 2517, TIAS No 6997
(1958). Although there is also a Hague Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, it has not been widely adopted. See The Hague Conference on Private International Law:
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 5 ILM 636 (1966) (reproduced from
the Final Act, dated April 26, 1966, of the Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law); Arthur T. von Mehren & Kurt H. Nadlemann, The Extraordinary Session of The
Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw 1966, 15 AmJ Comp L 361 (1967).
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taken in the agreements discussed below and the legislation that implements
them provide useful models and experience for considering whether and how
to create a framework for executing provisional and final judgments in
securities cases. Moreover, as discussed herein, experience under the EC
Convention shows that courts have effectively utilized the authority granted to
them to address problems similar to those confronted by the SEC. Renewed
U.S. interest in a convention on the enforcement ofjudgments was the subject
of a study group meeting at the U.S. State Department. On September 2,
1992, the study group discussed a U.S. proposal that the Hague Conference
on Private International Law consider the preparation of a new convention on
75
the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
A.

The Vienna Convention

The United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("Vienna Convention") provides a
mechanism for giving effect to foreign judgments in matters relating to drug
trafficking offenses. 76 In 1990, the United States became a party to the
Vienna Convention; as of late 1991, fifty-six countries have ratified the
convention. The Vienna Convention creates "a comprehensive domestic and
international [forfeiture] regime" 7 7 by, among other things, requiring that
each party enact domestic laws to enable it to identify, trace, and freeze
property derived from, or used in, drug trafficking and money laundering
offenses. Article 5(4) of the Convention specifically provides that parties
assist one another in the confiscation of proceeds or properties of such
offenses. 78 This provision of the Convention is unusual since countries
79
usually do not enforce the penal laws of other countries.
The Convention provides for two distinct methods for providing
assistance in enforcing judgments. The first is through the initiation of a
forfeiture proceeding in the jurisdiction of the requested party based on
information provided by the requesting party. 80 The second method is that
the requested party may, in essence, give full faith and credit to a forfeiture
75. Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law; Study Group on
Judgments; Meeting, 57 Fed Reg 35867-904 (1992).
76. 28 ILM 493 (1989). In addition, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 30 ILM 148 (1991) (Strasbourg Nov 8, 1990),
provides that the signatories will assist in giving effect to foreign judgments, including the institution
of provisional measures, for freezing assets from crime that at a later stage may be the subject of a
request for confiscation.
77. See Juan C. Marrero, Linda M. Samuel & Mary B. Troland, An Introduction to International
Forfeiture 17 (Dept ofJustice, Sept 1991).
78. Article 5(4)(a) provides that, following a request by another party with jurisdiction over
specific offenses, a party in whose territory proceeds, property, or instrumentalities are situated shall
(i) submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of
confiscation and, if such order is granted, give effect to it; or
(ii) submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the extent
requested, an order of confiscation issued by the requesting Party... in so far as it relates to
proceeds, property, instrumentalities . . .situated in the territory of the requested Party.
79. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482 (1987).
80. Vienna Convention, art 5(4)(a)(i).
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order entered in the requesting authority. 8 ' The alternatives were provided
to accommodate different legal systems. For example, in some countries,
such as the United States, it is not possible to enforce a foreign criminal
judgment of forfeiture, but one can proceed in rem against proceeds of
certain crimes if a factual basis is provided to establish that the property
82
constitutes proceeds of drug trafficking offenses.
In the United States, article 5(4)(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention is
implemented in part by section 981(a)(1)(B).8 3 This section authorizes,
through civil proceedings, the seizure and forfeiture of assets in the United
States that represent proceeds of drug-related crimes committed abroad. Its
effect is to ensure that tainted assets cannot be protected from seizure by
simply moving them to the United States. Among other things, this section
provides for civil forfeiture of property found in the United States that is
derived from or traceable to a violation of foreign law involving the
manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance,
without regard to whether a U.S. law is violated.
Under the U.S. statute, a certified copy of a foreign forfeiture order or
judgment encompassing the property is admissible and constitutes probable
cause in a civil forfeiture action brought in the United States.8 4 In addition, a
certified foreign judgment or conviction for a felony offense relating to
controlled substances is admissible into evidence and creates a rebuttable
presumption that the activity giving rise to the forfeiture has occurred.8 5 This
section also provides for the sharing of proceeds with a foreign country that
participated directly or indirectly in efforts that resulted in the seizure and
forfeiture of property.
B.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

Several mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs") also provide that one
country may request another, consistent with the requested country's
domestic law, to (1) freeze forfeitable assets; (2) initiate a forfeiture action
against property; (3) repatriate assets located abroad; and (4) enforce
81. Id at art 5(4)(a)(ii).
82. Marrero, Samuel & Troland, Introduction to International Forfeiture at 19 (cited in note 77).
83. 18 USC § 981 (Supp 1989). This section was originally enacted as § 1366(a) of the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-570, and amended as part of the Anti-Abuse Act of 1988.
Section 981 (a)(1) contains three subsections for the forfeiture of (a) assets traceable to, or involved
in, money laundering violations; (b) proceeds of foreign drug felonies; and (c) property constituting,
or derived from, proceeds traceable to a violation of the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub L No 101-73, 103 Stat 183 (1989). It has been proposed
that the civil forfeiture provisions be expanded to include the proceeds of foreign kidnappings,
robberies, and extortions. See Money Laundering Improvements Act of 1991, S 1665, 102d Cong,
1st Sess (Aug 2, 1991).
84. See 18 USC § 981(i)(3) (certified copy of foreign forfeiture order or judgment
encompassing subject property admissible and "shall constitute probable cause" in civil forfeiture
action against such property).
85. Id.
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forfeiture judgments issued by a foreign court.8 6 Through the U.S.
Department of Justice, the SEC has used mutual legal assistance treaties to
obtain provisional freezes of assets that it suspected were obtained in
violation of U.S. federal securities laws.8 7 Indeed, the willingness of the Swiss
authorities to provide assistance has proven crucial to the SEC's success in
precluding the dissipation of assets pending a final judgment, and thus in
safeguarding the funds for possible return to defrauded investors. The
Treaty does not cover the return of assets to defrauded investors - only
assets belonging to the requesting state. A Swiss magistrate, however,
determined that such proceeds could be returned to U.S. investors 8
pursuant to Article 74 of the Swiss federal law on international legal
assistance in criminal matters of March 20, 1981.89 This was an
unprecedented ruling; it opened the possibility of expanding current thinking
about mutual assistance legislation to cover this very important topic. It also
highlights that, absent such a creative approach, neither MLATs nor existing
mutual legal assistance legislation provide a certain or fully satisfactory
mechanism for enforcing judgments to ensure the return of funds to
defrauded investors in the U.S.
C.

European Convention

The European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters ("EC Convention") was adopted to facilitate
86. For example, in 1988, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into an agreement
relating to drug trafficking that specifically provided for assistance in freezing and forfeiting the
proceeds and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. See Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offenses and the Seizure and Forfeiture of
Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking [entry in force 1990]. See also The Drug
Trafficking Offenses Act and Criminal Justice Act 1988 (permitting enforcement of confiscation
orders) and The Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990.
87. The SEC has the means to request, through the U.S. Department of Justice, that assets be
frozen pursuant to criminal mutual legal assistance treaties. See, for example, Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and Switzerland (cited in note 29). See
also SEC v Dennis Levine, Diamond Holdings, S.A. InternationalGold, Inc. and Bernhard Meier, 86 Civ 3726
(SD NY 1986); SEC v BSI and Certain Unknown Purchasers of Call Options for the Common Stock of St. Joe
Minerals Corp., 81 Civ 1836 (SD NY 1981).
88. The underlying U.S. case, SEC v Eurobond Exchange Ltd. et al., Civil Case No 90-378 DT (CD
Cal), concerned, among other things, the fraudulent sale to the public of over $1 million of
unregistered securities, the proceeds of which are frozen in Switzerland. The securities were offered
by Gerald Leo Rogers, who made misrepresentations to investors about the use of the proceeds of
the sale of securities.
89. In his ruling the magistrate noted that the return of these proceeds was not required under
Swiss law but was discretionary based upon an examination of each case. One factor that the court
considered was the likelihood that the funds were the proceeds of the crime. In addition, the
magistrate considered whether: Rogers had the proceeds at his legal or actual disposal; in
Switzerland there were any rights of third parties that would bar the return of the monies; the
requesting state accords a corresponding right; and, guarantees are provided that the fate of the
assets would be determined in accordance with the principles of the European convention on the
protection of human rights and basic freedoms of November 4, 1950. See Order dated July 11, 1992,
Office of the Prosecuting Attorney IV for the Canton of Zurich, Office 2, Peter Cosandey, Attorney.
A previous attempt by the U.S. court-appointed trustee/receiver to secure the frozen funds
through proceedings before a cantonal court in Zurich had been unsuccessful.
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further the unification and integration of European Community legal
systems. 90 The EC Convention provides a model for assistance in executing
all types of judgments for both final relief and provisional relief in civil
matters. 9' Cases considered under the EC Convention further exemplify the
potential effectiveness that an understanding on execution of judgments
could provide. 9 2 In particular, in Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier,9 3 Haiti instituted
an action in France to recover money allegedly embezzled by members of the
former president's family who resided in France. The plaintiffs discovered
that the defendants were using a U.K. law firm to invest assets abroad, and
applied to the U.K. courts for a Mareva injunction, as well as an order
requiring the law firm to identify assets belonging to the defendants that had
not been identified in the French proceeding. The U.K. court determined
that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs had a "good arguable
case," and that there was evidence that the Duvalier family was secreting
90. In 1988, the Parallel Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters ("The Lugano Convention") was adopted in Lugano, Switzerland. It is in
force between France, Luxembourg, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland.
The United States and the United Kingdom negotiated a draft convention on the enforcement of
judgments in the late 1970s. One purpose of the draft convention was to limit the applicability of the
EC Convention to U.S. persons and entities. It was never signed, primarily because the United
Kingdom insurance industry, among others, strongly opposed the Convention due to concerns about
the potential for products liability claims against exporters. In addition, concerns were raised
regarding recognition" of multiple damages in antitrust actions. See P. M. North, The Draft U.K/U.S.
Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, I NwJ Intl L Bus 219 (1979); Peter Hay & RobertJ. Walker,
The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 Tex
Intl LJ 421 (1976); Hans Smit, The Proposed United States-UnitedKingdom Convention On Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototypefor the Future?, 17 VaJ Intl L 443 (1977).
91. All 12 member states are parties to the Brussels Convention but not all are parties to the
conventions as amended by the Spanish-Portuguese accession. Article 24 of the EC Convention
states that "Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional,
including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State ....In addition, the Council of Europe: European Convention on Certain International Aspects of
Bankruptcy, (30 ILM 165 (1991)), provides that bankruptcy liquidators may seek the assistance of
authorities in other countries for provisional measures.
92. In the U.K. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, the United Kingdom acceded to the
EC Convention, including article 24, see footnote 74. Prior to that time, a U.K. court would not have
had jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction to preserve assets in the United Kingdom, while the
subject matter of the action proceeded abroad. Under the legislation, a U.K. court has the power to
grant interim relief where proceedings are within the scope of the EC Convention and a foreign
proceeding has been or is about to be commenced. This power can be extended to cases from other
countries by "Order of Council".
In Denilaulerv S.n.c. Couchet Freres, [1980] ECR 1553, [1981] 1 CMLR 62, the EC court construed
article 24. In considering the question of whether articles 27(2) (default judgments not recognized if
defendant not provided sufficient notice) and 46(2) (requiring proof of service) applied to
proceedings in which provisional measures are taken without the defendant being heard, the court
held that the enforcement provisions of the EC Convention did not apply to ex parte provisional
orders.
The court recognized that the beneficial "surprise" effect of provisional measures would be
largely lost if service were required in order for provisional measures to be enforced pursuant to the
EC Convention. The court also stated, however, that article 24 would still permit any party to apply
to the courts of a contracting State for such provisional or protective measures as may be available
under the law of the enforcing State.
Commentators have stated that, by implication, Mareva injunctions with extraterritorial effect can
be provisionally enforced under the EC Convention, provided that the defendant is notified and has
an opportunity to oppose the order. See Collins, 105 L Q Rev at 292-94 (cited in note 43).
93. [1989] 2 WLR 261.
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assets in foreign jurisdictions in a deliberate attempt to move the assets from
the court's jurisdiction. Even though the defendants were outside of the U.K.
court's jurisdiction, it issued a Mareva injunction in aid of the proceedings in
France. The order restrained the defendants and the U.K. solicitors from
dealing with the proceeds identified in the French complaint, and other assets
wherever located. 9 4 The defendants were also ordered to disclose the value
of the assets. In upholding the order, the appeals court stated that, in light of
the plain and admitted intention of the defendants to move their assets out of
the reach of the law, coupled with the resources they have obtained and the
skill they had shown in doing so (citing to a prior Mareva case), "some
situations . . .cry out-as a matter of justice to the plaintiffs-for disclosure
orders and Mareva-type injunctions covering the foreign assets of defendants
95
even before judgment.
V
MODEL FOR ASSISTANCE IN ENFORCING JUDGMENTS IN
SECURITIES MATrERS

A.

MOUs

By melding the approaches taken in the Vienna and the EC Conventions
with the SEC's approach to MOUs, it may be possible to develop an effective
alternative that could achieve the same results as the unilateral actions taken
in Wang and Lee and Pantell and provide a more comprehensive approach to
enforcing judgments than that used in Antar. The resulting agreements would
address the concerns raised about the extraterritorial reach of foreign
courts 9 6 and reduce the potential for conflict between court decisions
rendered in more than one jurisdiction as to the status of assets maintained by
third parties on behalf of defendants. Finally, an internationally acceptable
approach would minimize uncertainties in the international banking system
about the potential for double liability that might be created by conflicting
legal obligations. 9 7 Such an approach may also reduce the timing problems
confronted in Fondation Hai.
Applying the MOU approach in the area of enforcing provisional orders
and final judgments would offer many of the same benefits as MOUs for the
exchange of information. For example, MOUs for assistance in enforcing
judgments would be negotiated and administered by the authorities with
94. Collins, 105 L Q Rev at 285 (cited in note 43).
95. Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1989] 2 WLR 261, 273 (citing Babanaft Intl. Co. S.A. v Bassatne,
[1989] 2 WLR 232, 247).
96. See, for example, Comment, SEC v. Standard Chartered Bank: Maintaining the Integrity of
U.S. CapitalMarkets or ExtraterritorialityRun Rampant, 22 L & Policy in Intl Bus 159 (1991) (authored
by Susan R. Essex).
97. For example, in Wang and Lee, SCB argued that it was subject to potential double liability if
the U.S. court required it to pay funds in the United States and the Hong Kong court also ordered it
to pay the money to Lee. Under the proposal described herein, it would be possible to avoid this
potential dilemma by having the foreign bank be subject to a consistent order in the jurisdiction
where the funds are maintained.
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direct responsibility for initiating actions in domestic courts to enforce
securities laws. Therefore, the authorities providing the assistance would be
experienced in enforcing securities judgments and obtaining provisional
measures from the relevant courts or authorities. Moreover, the parties to
such an MOU would fashion agreements that bridge the differences in how
such relief may be obtained under different legal systems. Finally, if the
MOUs are negotiated on a bilateral basis, as are the MOUs on information
sharing, it is likely that they can be negotiated more quickly than treaties or
multilateral conventions such as the Vienna or EC Conventions.
As discussed in more detail below, an MOU on enforcement ofjudgments
would, among other things, (1) identify the scope of assistance that would be
available, as well as the types of cases covered; (2) establish procedures for
seeking assistance under the MOU; and (3) set forth any limitations on the
ability of an authority to provide such assistance.
1. The Scope of Assistance That Would Be Available. The remedies available to
securities regulators will differ from country to country. At the outset, it will
therefore be critical for the MOU to identify with particularity the types of
remedies that could be provided. The logical starting point would be to
include assistance for cases involving provisional measures or final judgments
that serve to deprive wrongdoers of the profits of their illegal activity, and for
the recovery of funds for return to defrauded investors. This approach would
address the problems raised in Wang and Lee, Unifund, and Antar.
Given the differences in statutory schemes for regulating securities, it will
be critical for the MOU to identify the range of securities matters for which
assistance will be available. It is expected that, at a minimum, such an
agreement would cover cases involving fraud. 98 Even though there may not
be international unanimity about enforcement cases involving more technical
issues such as disclosure and reporting requirements, there is general
willingness to interdict fraud. Optimally, MOUs that cover a full range of
securities matters could be negotiated.
2. The Proceduresfor Seeking Assistance Under the MOU. As noted in Part IV
above, under certain circumstances, courts in the United States and elsewhere
already recognize and enforce foreign judgements. The value of the MOU
would be to provide a direct and credible avenue for access to the courts or
other appropriate tribunals to facilitate the execution of requests in an
effective, uniform, and timely manner.
The MOU would provide specific procedures for an authority to follow
when seeking to have a provisional order or final judgment executed in the
98. It is not anticipated that the MOU would encompass enforcement of penalties since
currently many countries, including the United States, generally will not enforce the penal judgments
of other countries. Thus, concerns about assessing the fairness and proportionality of a penalty
imposed by a foreign court before enforcing such a penalty can be avoided. In some areas, however,
consensus is being reached that, to fully combat crime, recognition may be given to penal judgments
of a particular class, such as with the Vienna Convention.
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legal system of the other authority. It is anticipated that the MOU would. be
available, for example, where the SEC brought an action in a U.S. court
alleging violations of the federal securities laws seeking either a provisional
order blocking or freezing alleged illicit profits, wherever in the world they
may be located, or a final judgment for permanent relief. After a hearing or
trial, the U.S. judge would rule on the substantive question of whether the
facts before it supported granting the requested relief.
While the U.S. court's order could theoretically be enforced directly with
respect to funds within its jurisdiction, in reality, enforcement is difficult when
third parties maintain assets on behalf of defendants that are physically
located outside the United States. Similar difficulties occur when, as in Wang
and Lee and Antar, defendants within the U.S. court's personal jurisdiction
refuse to abide by orders relating to assets located outside the United States.
In such cases, the SEC would request assistance from a foreign securities
authority. The SEC would provide the foreign authority with certified
documentation of the U.S. court's order, similar to that required by the
Vienna Convention, 9 9 as well as an affidavit or other information
demonstrating that some, or perhaps all, of the illegally obtained assets were
located within the foreign jurisdiction. Upon receipt of the request, the
certified documentation of the order, and evidence that assets related to the
matter were located in its country, the foreign authority, pursuant to both the
MOU and domestic law, would petition its courts or proper authorities for
relief on behalf of the SEC.' 0 0
3. Limitations on the Ability to Provide Assistance. Consistent with U.S. law, the
MOU would need to incorporate clearly traditional grounds for not
recognizing judgments. For example, assistance could be refused in instances
where the court of origin lacked jurisdiction over the matter, there was fraud
involved in securing the foreign order, enforcement of the foreign order
would be contrary to domestic public policy, or the foreign judgment was
rendered under a system that did not provide procedures compatible with due
process of law. 1 0 '
B.

U.S. Legislative Considerations

The premise of any MOU on the enforcement of provisional measures
and final judgments would be the mutual enforceability of provisional orders
and final judgments that fall within the scope of the MOU. While courts in the
United States recognize and enforce foreign judgments, this practice has
99. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
100. It would be anticipated that a similar procedure would be followed for requests for
assistance by a foreign authority to the SEC.
101. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482; Uniform
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13 ULA 261 § 4 (1986); Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113
(1895). It is unlikely, however, that the SEC or any other regulator would enter into an MOU with a
regulator whose national legal system did not provide sufficient procedural and substantive rights.
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developed through a case-by-case approach.' 0 2 Thus, while it might be
possible to rely on the current method, the enactment of legislation that
expressly provides the necessary foundation for such action should be
considered. The SEC has recently informed Congress of its intention to
consider such an approach.10 3
A legislative approach would follow current practice and thus would not
introduce new concepts into a court's consideration of whether to enforce a
foreign judgment. Rather, it would help lay the legal foundation for a U.S.
court to receive and effectuate a foreign securities judgment or provisional
measure obtained by a foreign securities authority. It would thus incorporate
well-established grounds under U.S. law for the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. For example, in Hilton v. Guyot, 10 4 the Supreme Court
established a general rule favoring the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments without reexamination of the merits of the dispute. 10 5
These standards have been incorporated into the Uniform Money Judgments
Recognition Act, which has been adopted by sixteen states.10 6
The implementation of MOUs through legislation would provide certainty
as to the governing procedure, as well as to the types and extent of relief
available. In addition, it would provide a model for foreign authorities to
follow. Its procedures would be crafted in a manner that would create a
mechanism responsive to U.S. concerns and thus, if duplicated abroad, would
ensure that reciprocal assistance would be available. 10 7 Most importantly, a
102. Although the United States "is among the most receptive nations with regard to recognition
and enforcement of foreign country judgments," unlike sister state judgments, foreign country
judgments are not governed by the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. As a result,
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by state common law. Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, United States of America, in Platto, ed, Enforcement of Foreignjudgments Worldwide 259 (cited in
note 10); Gary B. Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 563-64
(Kluwer, 1989); von Mehren, 17 VaJ Intl L at 402 (cited in note 4).
103. See SEC Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992-1994, dated April 1991.
104. 159 US 113 (1895).
105. The Court stressed that retrying foreign cases was not favored:
[Wihere there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system ofjurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system
of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case
should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a
new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion by the party that the judgment was
erroneous in law or in fact.
Hilton v Guyot, 159 US at 202-03.
106. With respect to reciprocity, as with Exchange Act § 21(a)(2), legislation might contain
requirements that the SEC consider the availability of reciprocal assistance, as well as the U.S. public
interest, in deciding whether to assist a foreign securities authority in enforcing a judgment in the
United States.
107. Implementing legislation also may delineate procedures for granting a request to enforce a
final judgment. The procedural aspects of such requests, which could be very similar to those used
in purely domestic cases. See, for example, FRCP 65. For example, the SEC, acting on behalf of the
foreign securities authority, could appear in the U.S. court to present the judgment or order. If
emergency relief is sought on the basis of a foreign finding that the fruits of illegal securities activity
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legislative approach would create uniform protections to be utilized by U.S.
courts to insure against abuse of the system.' 0 8
VI
CONCLUSION

Maintaining the integrity of international markets requires effective
enforcement. Accordingly, regulators must continue to develop the means to
catch, prosecute, and deter those who commit fraud. Depriving those
wrongdoers of their illicit profits is not only a powerful deterrent, but also has
the added benefit of compensating the victims of fraud. As with mechanisms
for information sharing, there would be significant and tangible benefits to
developing agreements on the enforcement of provisional orders and final
judgments. Such agreements would avoid jurisdictional confrontations
caused by the need to take unilateral measures, and maximize the
opportunities to take the profit out of crime. The end result would be to
strengthen the international securities markets by increasing investor
confidence in those markets.

may otherwise be dissipated, the U.S. court, as in a purely domestic matter, could issue an ex parte
order for a ten day duration, at the conclusion of which the SEC and the defendants would have an
opportunity to appear and argue the question of whether a preliminary judgment should issue. Such
assistance could be available, for example, where (1) the foreign court has issued an order in such
action to preserve the availability of assets or property or other similar relief for purposes of securing
satisfaction of a future judgment for equitable or legal relief; and (2) there is a reasonable basis for
concluding that the failure to grant such an order could result in assets or property being removed
from the court's jurisdiction, dissipated, or conveyed to another person, or could otherwise impair
the ability of the foreign securities authority or court to enforce a future judgment.
108. A central concern when considering potential legislation for effectuating foreign provisional
orders and final judgments is ensuring that the fairness of the domestic legal systems are not
compromised. In this regard, it may be beneficial for the legislation to authorize the U.S. court to
evaluate whether findings by the foreign court or tribunal were based on full and fair consideration
of the facts and were consistent with traditional standards. However, consistent with the approach
taken in Hilton v Guyot, in enforcing foreign provisional orders and final judgments, it is important
that the findings of a foreign court that meet the necessary criteria for enforcement are accepted
without the enforcing court "looking behind" the foreign order to consider independently the case
as a whole. It must recognize that a foreign regulatory or prosecutorial body with jurisdiction over a
matter often must draw facts from many disparate sources; those facts are then weighed against the
law of the jurisdiction by a local court according to its legal precedents and procedures. The
provisional order or final judgment is then issued pursuant to those legal standards.
In another context, Congress authorized the SEC to act based on findings by a foreign court or
foreign securities authority. In the Securities Acts Amendments of 1990, the SEC was authorized to
institute administrative proceedings against a securities professional whom a foreign authority has
found to have violated foreign laws substantially similar to those of the United States. The purpose
of the proceedings are to determine if the securities professional should be precluded from
conducting unrestricted operations in the U.S. securities markets. See 1990 Exchange Act
§ 15(b)(4)(G), 104 Stat 2715.

